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PILOTS' CONFLICT DETECTION WITH IMPERFECT CONFLICT ALERTING SYSTEM
FOR THE COCKPIT DISPLAY OF TRAFFIC INFORMATION
Xidong Xu, Christopher D. Wickens, and Esa M. Rantanen
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Savoy, Illinois
Twenty-four pilots viewed dynamic encounters between the pilot’s “ownship” and an intruder aircraft on a 2-D
simulated Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) and estimated the point and time of closest approach. A
three-level alert system provided a correct categorical estimate of the projected miss distance (MD) on 83% of the
trials. The remaining 17% of alerts incorrectly predicted MD. The data of these pilots were compared with a
matched “baseline” pilots, who viewed identical trials without the aid of automated alerts. Roughly half the pilots
depended on and benefited from this automation, and others did not. Those who benefited did so when problems
were difficult but not when they were easy. Furthermore, automation benefits were observed only when automation
was correct, but automation costs were not observed when it was in error. While assisting miss distance prediction,
the automation led to an underestimate of the time remaining till the point of closest approach.
Introduction
Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) will
play a key role in a new flight environment known as
free flight, allowing pilots to detect and avoid poten-
tial conflict by providing graphic information regard-
ing nearby traffic’s locations, speeds, altitudes, and
other information relative to the ownship (Johnson,
Battiste, & Bochow, 1999; Wickens, Helleberg, &
Xu, 2002). Airborne conflict detection is a cogni-
tively demanding task, and consequently automated
aids have been invoked to assist pilots in their new
charge. However, future flight paths are inherently
uncertain  due  to  a  number  of  factors  such  as  wind
shift, pilots’ intentions to change flight plans, and
look-ahead time, making perfect predictions impossi-
ble (e.g., Kuchar, 2001). These uncertainty factors
may lead to two types of errors in automated conflict
alerting: misses (no alert of real conflict) and false
alarms (safe separations treated as conflicts). In addi-
tion to the safety consequences that may result from
pilots’ over-trusting or over-depending on these erro-
neous automation outcomes, both high false alarm
rates and high miss rates may cause operators to mis-
trust the system, which may in turn cause under-use
(or under-dependence) and even disuse of the system
(Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). The implications of
this unreliability of automation in conflict detection
are of particular interest to us.
In general, correctly functioning automation tends to
improve overall system performance relative to un-
aided performance (Dixon, Wickens, & Chang, in
press; Metzger & Parasuraman, 2005; Yeh & Wick-
ens, 2001). However, automation benefits may not
always be realized if the manually performed task
had been easy (Rovira & Parasuraman, 2002),
whereas automation benefits can be substantial when
tasks are difficult in their manual form (Dixon &
Wickens, 2004; Maltz & Shinar, 2003, Wickens &
Dixon, 2005). On the other hand, costs of inaccurate
automation may be larger for difficult tasks than for
easy tasks (Dixon & Wickens, 2004; Maltz & Shinar,
2003; Wickens, Gempler, & Morphew, 2000). The
costs and benefits can easily be interpreted with the
mediating concept of automation dependence. As
tasks become more difficult, users become more de-
pendent on automation to assist them, which will
provide greater benefits when the automation is cor-
rect, but greater costs when it “fails” due to reduced
situation awareness and/or skill degradation resulting
from complacency (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wick-
ens, 2000). One noticeable phenomenon is that when
reliability is above 70%–75%, there are benefits but
no costs relative to manual performance, especially
when  the  task  is  difficult  (e.g.,  Wickens  &  Dixon,
2005; Maltz & Meyer, 2003).
It appears that only two experiments have examined
the issue of human responses to imperfect automation
in aviation conflict detection and avoidance, by
Metzger and Parasuraman (2005) and Wickens et al.
(2000). The findings of Metzger and Parasuraman
(conflict detection in air traffic control) and Wickens
et al. (conflict avoidance using a CDTI) collectively
show that correct automation is beneficial to per-
formance and inaccurate automation poses costs,
consistent with the general pattern found in other
studies. The results are also in agreement with the
general finding that costs and benefits are more likely
to emerge for difficult (vs. easy) task, which would
more likely make people depend on automation.
The goal of the present study focused on how correct
and erroneous predictions of an imperfect automation
alert affected performance in relation to the unaided
baseline performance reported in Xu, Rantanen, and
Wickens (2004), and how the effect of automation
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reliability was modulated by task difficulty. Based on
the literature reviewed above, we formulated several
hypotheses: (1) that conflict detection performance
using a CDTI with an imperfect automated alerting
system (83% reliable in the current study) predicting
the  miss  distance  (MD)  at  the  closest  point  of  ap-
proach (CPA) between the ownship and an intruder
would be better than unaided performance (Wickens
& Dixon, 2005); (2a) that correct automation with a
valid MD alert would improve performance and (2b)
error automation with invalid MD alert would hinder
performance relative to manual performance on
equivalent difficulty (Metzger & Parasuraman,
2005); (3a) that increasing trial difficulty would am-
plify the effect of reliability as mediated by increased
dependence; that is, for correct automation, automa-
tion would provide greater performance improvement
relative to manual performance for hard trials than
for easy trials, and (3b) for automation errors, auto-
mation would induce greater performance costs rela-
tive to manual performance for hard trials than for
easy trials (Dixon & Wickens, 2004).
Method
Participants
Twenty-four pilots (22 male and two female; age
ranging between 18-25 years, with a mean of 19.8
years) different from the baseline study reported
elsewhere (Xu, Rantanen, et al., 2004) were recruited
from the Institute of Aviation, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign.
Simulation and Task
The CDTI depicted ownship and intruder in a map
(top-down) view (see Figure 1). The display repre-
sented ownship by a white triangle and the intruder
by a solid circle in cyan, yellow, or red, depending on
the MD alert level.   Ownship icon was positioned in
the center of the display throughout the whole ex-
periment, thus yielding an egocentric view of the
traffic situation, where the ownship icon appeared to
be stationary to the participant. The ownship and the
intruder  were  flying  at  the  same  altitude  on  straight
converging courses and at constant but not necessar-
ily same speeds. At the start of a trial, a conflict pre-
dictor provided a three-level MD alert (no alert if MD
> 3.5 nm; low level alert if 1.5 nm < MD < 3.5 nm;
and high level alert if MD < 1.5 nm). The three levels
of MD alert were indicated by different colors of the
intruder icon, along with different verbal warnings
(cyan and no verbal warning for no alert, yellow and
“traffic traffic” for low level alert, and red and “con-
flict conflict” for high level alert). The intruder icon
retained the color throughout a trial and the verbal
warning  was  given  once  at  the  beginning  of  a  trial.
To simulate a less than perfectly reliable predictor, on
one in every six trials, the automation provided erro-
neous prediction of MD, indicating MD that was in a
greater (a miss) or smaller separation (a false alarm)
category than the true value.
Participants individually observed the development
of a conflict scenario for 15 sec, after which the sce-
nario froze. They were then required to mentally ex-
trapolate the development of the scenario, press a key
when they estimated that the CPA was reached,
thereby providing the estimate accuracy of time to
CPA (TCPA), and move the cursor to a location that
they believed was the CPA, thus providing the esti-
mate accuracy of MD. Pilots were instructed that
when the MD alert was correct, they were supposed
to take advantage of it. However, when they believed
that the predictor provided invalid MD prediction, the
pilots were asked to ignore it and make their estima-
tions based on their own judgments.
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of key components
of the experimental paradigm.
Experimental Design and Procedure
This experiment employed a repeated measures de-
sign. However, the data for pilots in this experiment
using automation were statistically compared with
matched data from the “baseline” study, on identical
conflict trials, performed without the aid of automa-
tion, as reported in Xu, Rantanen, et al. (2004). The
trials with differing geometries in the baseline ex-
periment that produced the easy and hard trials were
randomly chosen to create an independent variable of
task difficulty for the present experiment, which was
varied within subjects. Trial difficulty was inferred
from pilot performance, with smaller errors indicat-
ing easy trials and greater errors hard trials (see Xu,
Wickens, & Rantanen, 2004 for full details).
The second independent variable was automation
correctness (error vs. correct). Each participant re-
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ceived 60 correct automation trials and 12 automation
error trials (reliability of 83%), the latter equally rep-
resenting misses and false alarms, of large and small
magnitude. The 24 pilots were chosen such that their
flying experience was roughly equal to that of the
corresponding pilots in the baseline experiment. The
72 trials were quasi-randomly presented to the pilot.
The automation error trials were in turn quasi-
randomly distributed within the total 72 trials.
The participants were explicitly told that the MD
predictor would not be 100% reliable. They per-
formed ten practice trials, with a valid predictor for
the first six trials and an invalid predictor for the re-
maining four trials, being informed explicitly of the
invalidity of the last four trials. Then they partici-
pated in one experimental session to complete two
blocks of 36 trials each for one to two hours in total.
Dependent Measures
The dependant variables were absolute and signed
MD and TCPA estimate errors, derived by subtract-
ing the true values from the estimated values. Abso-
lute errors would reveal the estimation accuracy, and
signed errors would reveal the estimation directions
(under- or overestimate), an indication of biases. Our
attention was focused on the MD measures as pilot-
estimated MD represented the most safety-critical
aspect of the pilot’s assessment of conflict risk.
Results
Data Reduction and Analysis
A good measure of automation dependence is the
difference in performance between conditions of er-
ror and correct automation (Maltz & Shinar, 2003),
with a large difference being indicative of heavy de-
pendence. We measured automation dependence by
the difference in absolute MD estimate error between
the automation error trials and the correct automation
trials, given that only MD prediction was automated,
as well as the fact that MD is the primary measure of
conflict risk. The difference was calculated separately
for each individual pilot, thus yielding two levels of
automation dependence (light and heavy) for the 24
pilots using a median-split method. The light depend-
ence pilots mostly encountered easy trials, whereas
the heavy dependence pilots mostly had hard trials.
Analyses for Heavy Dependence Group
Hypothesis 1 was tested by two-sample t-tests for
means and hypotheses 2 and 3 by 2 × 2 ANOVAs.
Overall Effect of Automation (Hypothesis 1). Abso-
lute  MD  estimate  error  was  .13  nm  smaller  in  the
current experiment (M = .33 nm) than in the corre-
sponding trials collected in the baseline experiment
(M = .46 nm), t(22) = -1.83, p = .04, suggesting that
the automated alerts used here, even though imper-
fect, nonetheless benefited MD estimation. However,
absolute TCPA estimate error did not differ signifi-
cantly between the automation and manual (baseline)
groups, t(22) = .63, p = .27.
MD Estimate Error (Hypotheses 2 & 3). Figure  2
presents  the  MD  error  for  the  baseline  and  automa-
tion experiments. A 2 (automation vs. manual base-
line) × 2 (easy vs. hard conflict problems) mixed
ANOVA for the automation error trials and the cor-
responding baseline (manual) trials (the left side of
Figure 2) revealed that absolute MD estimate error
did not significantly differ between the two experi-
ments, F(1, 22) = .56, p = .46, and performance on
hard trials was poorer than on easy trials in both ex-
periments, F(1, 22) = 17.40, p < .0001. Furthermore,
the same ANOVA revealed that the difference in
performance between easy and hard trials in the pre-
sent experiment was not reduced compared to that in
the baseline experiment, since the interaction be-
tween experimental condition and task difficulty was






































Figure 2. Absolute MD estimate errors for heavy
dependence group by automation correctness and
task difficulty, and the corresponding baseline trials.
In contrast, a 2 (automation vs. manual) × 2 (easy vs.
hard) mixed ANOVA for the correct automation tri-
als and the corresponding baseline trials (the right
side of Figure 2) revealed that performance was bet-
ter (smaller error) than in the baseline experiment,
F(1, 22) = 4.19, p = .053, and performance on easy
trials was better than on hard trials, F(1, 22) = 36.73,
p < .0001. Most importantly, the difference in per-
formance between the easy and hard trials in the cur-
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rent experiment was reduced compared to that in the
baseline experiment, indicated by a significant inter-
action between experimental condition and task diffi-
culty, F(1, 22) = 6.89, p = .015.
Analysis on signed MD estimate error suggests that
there was a tendency for the MD to be less underes-
timated in the current experiment compared to the
baseline experiment, especially when the automation
was correct and the task was hard (see Xu, Wickens,
et al., 2004 for detailed analysis). Therefore, the
automation moved the signed estimates  closer  to  the
true value, reducing a conservative bias to underesti-
mate MD that had been observed in the baseline
study (see Xu, Rantanen, et al., 2004)
TCPA Estimate Error (Hypotheses 2 & 3). The re-
sults of a 2 (automation vs. manual) × 2 (easy vs.
hard) mixed ANOVA revealed that when the automa-
tion was present and in error (left half of Figure 3),
absolute TCPA (time) estimate error did not differ
significantly from that in the baseline experiment,
F(1, 22) = 2.35, p = .14; and performance on the hard
trials was  constantly poorer than on the easy ones in
both experiments, F(1, 22) = 28.86, p < .0001. There
was no significant interaction between the two factors

































Figure 3. Absolute TCPA estimate errors for heavy
dependence group by automation correctness and
task difficulty, and the corresponding baseline trials.
However, when the automation was correct (right
half  of  Figure  3),  the  increase  in  task  difficulty  im-
posed greater cost to performance than in the baseline
experiment as indicated by greater absolute TCPA
estimate error. This trend was confirmed by the re-
sults of a 2 (automation vs. manual) × 2 (easy vs.
hard) mixed ANOVA, which revealed that the hard
trials were still harder than the easy ones in the cur-
rent experiment, F(1, 22) = 69.32, p < .0001, but the
significant interaction between experimental condi-
tion and task difficulty suggests that the hard trials
(with automation) in the current experiment induced
greater TCPA (time) estimation error than the corre-
sponding hard trials (without automation) in the base-
line experiment, F(1, 22) = 6.37, p = .019.
Similar to the analyses on signed MD estimate error,
we also looked at the data on signed TCPA estimate
error (estimating conflict to be too early or too late)
in both experiments. The analyses revealed that for
both the correct and error automation trials, TCPA
was more underestimated than their baseline counter-
parts, (closest passage estimated to arrive sooner than
it actually would); this bias was amplified on hard
trials, in both experiments (see Xu, Wickens, et al.,
2004 for more detailed analysis).
Analyses for Light Dependence Group
Analyses were performed for the light dependence
group in the same way as those for the heavy de-
pendence group and the results show that none of the
hypotheses were supported for the light dependence
group, Fs < 1 and ts < 1. This pattern of results thus
suggests that the light dependence pilots did not use
the automation, and hence were unaffected by its
properties. Moreover, absolute MD estimate error
was  greater  on  the  hard  trials  than  on  the  easy  trials
for both the correct automation trials and the corre-
sponding baseline trials, F(1, 22) = 16.36, p = .001,
and the difference between hard and easy trials was
not significantly reduced by automation, F(1, 22) =
.047, p = .83, suggesting that these pilots should have
used (but did not) automation for support.
Discussion
First, we had not originally anticipated the wide
range of automation dependence between partici-
pants. Given such a range, it made sense to focus our
hypothesis testing regarding automation properties
primarily upon those who depended on automation in
the first place, since those who did not would be ex-
pected to show generally null results of automation
correctness (and indeed they did). Because those low
dependence pilots were people who were more likely
paired with those pilots who encountered easier prob-
lems in the baseline experiment, they also generally
received easier problems in the current experiment. It
appears that those low dependence pilots did not feel
the need to obtain assistance from the automation,
presumably because the task was relatively easy, al-
though our analysis revealed that they should still
have used it to improve performance. In contrast,
since the high dependence pilots received the more
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difficult trials, it might have appeared to be an advis-
able strategy to depend on the automation to enhance
performance. Indeed they generally were found to
benefit from automation regarding the most critical
safety-relevant or risk measure of conflict under-
standing, the estimation of MD at the closest point of
approach. Performance of these pilots was better than
that of their demographically matched counterparts in
the baseline experiment, facing problems of equiva-
lent difficulty but unaided, thus, supporting Hypothe-
sis  1.  Importantly,  the  data  show  that  with  an  error
rate of 17% (83% reliability), pilots clearly benefited
from imperfect automation, a data point that adds to
the general conclusion that imperfect automation
above a 70-75% rate is better than no automation at
all when workload is high and the task is difficult
(Wickens & Dixon, 2005).
The analysis examining Hypothesis 2 revealed, as
expected, that benefits were only realized when
automation was correct and not when it  was in error
(thus supporting Hypothesis 2a; Figure 2). However,
the results were a little surprising in that even on the
automation error trials performance was no worse
than its level had been in the baseline experiment,
and sometimes showed a hint of being better (thus
refuting Hypothesis 2b). That is, unlike other find-
ings, erroneous automation did not yield a “compla-
cency cost” of over-dependence, corresponding to an
automation-induced beta shift (e.g., Maltz & Shinar,
2003; Metzger & Parasuraman, 2005; Yeh & Wick-
ens, 2001). One partial explanation is that pilots were
clearly pre-warned of the less-than perfect character-
istics, and so were presumably not “caught” by a first
failure effect, which is typically used to document the
effect of over-trust, over-dependence, or “compla-
cency” (e.g., Yeh & Wickens, 2001).
How did the high dependence pilots show a benefit
from imperfect automation when it was correct, but
no cost  when it  was  wrong? Part  of  the  answer  may
be because the pilots’ response (positioning the cur-
sor on the location of the projected CPA) was differ-
ent from the actual guidance given by the automation
predicted MD. In interpreting our results, we assume
that when the high- and low-level alert appeared,
pilots invested a high level of perceptual and cogni-
tive processing of the raw data—a careful inspec-
tion—in order to most accurately estimate the CPA.
This effort investment was greater than that for corre-
sponding pilots in the baseline experiment, who did
not receive the alert. Such behavior would lead to
enhanced accuracy even when the alert was incorrect.
When the alert was “silent” in contrast, pilots might
have maintained an equivalent level of inspection to
their manual baseline counterparts.
Another, parallel way of accounting for the data is to
assume an overall improvement in performance of
the current experiment versus the baseline experi-
ment, perhaps due to a motivational increase from
having the automation available (e.g., Beck, Dzi-
nodolet, Pierce, & Piatt, 2003). Within the overall
improved performance, the cost-benefit differences
associated with automation error versus correct still
existed (at least on the difficult problems; see Figure
2). However, any cost for error automation was then
entirely offset by the overall benefit of improved mo-
tivation and performance, particularly when the alert
sounded, as described above, triggering a closer in-
spection of the raw data.
The finding that automation benefits emerged on high
difficulty trials (thus supporting Hypothesis 3a; Fig-
ure 3) is a familiar and expected one (e.g., Dixon &
Wickens, 2003, 2004; Maltz & Shinar, 2003). It is
also important to note that a major feature of the high
difficulty was the long distance to the closest point of
approach, creating a lengthening of space over which
projection  must  take  place,  that  would  be  typical  as
we extrapolate the current results to the more strate-
gic uses of the CDTI that are envisioned (e.g., 2-4
minute look-ahead time). In such a case, pilots would
either have to project across a larger region of the
display or if the display scale were minified, they
would  have  to  project  across  a  slower  velocity  sym-
bol movement, a prediction that is also more diffi-
culty  (Xu,  Rantanen,  et  al., 2004) and so, again,
would be likely to benefit from imperfect automation.
Another finding that was not anticipated was the dis-
tance-time estimation accuracy trade-off that was
produced by automation. That is, while automation
appeared to improve the accuracy of performance on
the most critical task associated with conflict estima-
tion–the estimation of miss distance at the CPA– it
actually disrupted the accuracy of estimating the time
till that CPA would occur. Why this occurred may be
accounted for by a resource trade-off—the require-
ment to process both the automated alert and the raw
visual data for miss distance required more resources.
Such resources were diverted from the time estima-
tion process, which was itself resource limited (Za-
kay, Block, & Tsal, 1999). Given then that time
would be more poorly estimated as a consequence of
resource diversion, pilots adopted a “conservative
strategy” to underestimate that time; that is, to give
themselves less time available than they really have.
In conclusion, the results have clearly illustrated the
benefits that can be provided by even imperfect or
“unreliable” CDTI alerting, at least given the rela-
tively high reliability level about 80%. Such benefits
–without costs – are, we believe, the result of three
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factors: (1) Raw data were available to be inspected;
(2) pilots were calibrated to the approximate reliabil-
ity level, and (3) a three-level alert was employed.
We might project that increases in multi- task work-
load to a level more typical of the cockpit might am-
plify the benefits, just as decreasing the automation
error rate would have had the same effects. However,
it is possible that these two changes, while amplify-
ing the benefits of correct automation, may have led
to the emergence of costs on automation-error trials.
Finally, caution needs to be exercised when general-
izing the results here regarding the effects of automa-
tion unreliability to the real world situations, where
the conflict base rate is much lower than in the pre-
sent study.
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